The problem of feeling and sensory experience in the philosophy of I. Kant
Annotation
Kant’s philosophy gave a new understanding not only of reason, its possibilities and limits, but also of sensuality. To become one of the sources of knowledge, as well as a conductor of moral action, feeling cannot be just passivity, as Kant’s position is often interpreted, but it must have its own way of acting. Kant’s Copernican revolution leads to a certain transformation of sensuality, which is based on its own energy of action, a special attitude of the subject to himself. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant describes this transformation as a transition from suffering to a sense of respect for the moral law and further to a sense of self-satisfaction, which forms a middle link between feeling and the objective basis of the will. The “Critique of pure reason” confronts us with the problem of the reality of the external world, and the solution to this problem for Kant is the analysis of the shape of space as evidence of the action of things in themselves. Moreover, feelings here act not just as impressions of this external influence, but also as a necessary form of reversal from external action to action, which no longer comes from things, but from the mind itself. Thus, feelings act as a necessary condition for synthesis as a combination of external action with the action of the mind, the result of which is a system of knowledge.
Keywords
Kant, feeling, action of reason, respect, suffering, space, time, line, movement, synthesis.
Literature
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4. Leibnits G. V. Soch. Soch. [Essays]: In 4 vols. Vol 1. M.: Mysl’ Publ., 1982. 636 s.
(In Russian).