IS THERE A PLACE FOR TELEOLOGY IN COMPATIBILISM? The Solution to the Question of Free Will by S. Sekhon and V. V. Vasiliev

Annotation

This article continues the study of free will in a world explained by causality. Should determinism insist that human action occurs solely as a result of the laws of nature and past events? Is a causal explanation of free action sufficient, or should it be explained teleologically, i.e., as a goal-directed action? Attention is focused on two concepts that answer the first question negatively: S. Sehon's theory of teleological explanation of action and V.V. Vasiliev's ultracompatibilism. Both authors dispute the arguments of J.M. Fischer, who insists on the sufficiency of directional control in understanding free will, i.e., on the sufficiency of a decision-making mechanism without the real possibility of acting differently within the causal chain. I examine Sekhon's arguments for applying a teleological approach to explaining free will, and also point out the inconsistencies that arise in his conception, stemming from the English author's insistence on the independence of teleological and causal approaches within the weak naturalist position and, concurrently, his reduction of the deterministic approach to the explanation of action alone. Vasiliev's conception clearly fails to utilize teleology to explain free action as the ability to act differently given a corresponding desire. I demonstrate that there are appropriate arguments for appealing to a teleological approach within the framework of ultracompatibilism. At the same time, Vasiliev's conception points to a more reliable way to reconcile determinism with the affirmation of free will by understanding desire as causally relevant within the causal chain.

Keywords

J. M. Fisher, free will, causal explanation, purposefulness, rational choice, desire, qualitative state, local interactionism, ultracompatibilism

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The study was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation № 24–28–00295,
https://rscf.ru/en/project/24–28–00295/; Тhe Russian Christian Academy for the Humanities named
after Fyodor Dostoevsky, 15, Fontanka Embankment, Saint Petersburg, 191023, Russian Federation